Dear O'Dear

I see white people...

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/5/18/20037/6285/661/518011

Also, fun cordially invited @

http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/2008/05/a-pat-buchanan-joke.php

Hmmmm . . . Loaves o' bread . . . Check! Basket o' fish . . . Check.

72K is as many as who have voted for McCain total . . .

a bit of perspective here might be interesting, Eric.

when was the last time a presidential candidate pulled a 75,000-person crowd before they were officially the nominee of their party? ever?

So is this how long it took you to find the one citation with 72K, when MSNBC and every other news organization in the country has been calling it 75?

Pathetic.

I think this is what you call a movement.

Eric,

Senator Obama needs sixteen of the 103 pledged delegates to get the majority. The campaign is not bluffing, wishing, spinning or hoping it will go over the top on pledged on Tuesday. They did not need the rally to give them confidence or solidify their confidence.

The only thing at issue about Tuesday is: will Kentucky put Obama over the top while Oregon voters are still dropping off ballots?

Wow!
Nothing else to say!

Amazing. Utterly amazing. Look at all those white people! I'll bet they're hard workers, too. heheheh

Luckily Senator McCain was taking his afternoon nap while all of this was going on.

I was there. My wife and I were less than 30 ft from Obama. It was truly awesome. I was a member of the organizing committee and one of the keynote speakers at the first fundraiser for Obama in Portland about a year ago. On that occasion, through the net and personal outreach we got about 100 people to show up to a fifty dollar a head fundraiser. To see this grow from 100 to 75,000 has been truly remarkable.

Portland is a special place, and I have been around long enough to know that it is easy to be seduced into forgetting that everyone does not share our point of view, but I think this was significant by any standard. The collective energy was very empowering; 75,000 chanting, "Yes, we can", was pretty amazing.
This feels like more than a campaign; it feels like a movement.

The crowd tended toward Obama's demographic groups: mostly under fifty; mostly white, but with a noticeable mix of black, brown, and yellow; probably mostly educated, but not uniform in any way. It took hours for everyone to line up, go through security, and wait for the candidate. It was very festive and everyone was friendly and patient standing under a very hot sun.

Bottom Line: It made me proud of my city and my candidate. Most importantly, it made me hopeful for my country.

I am in Oregon and Obama's staff here are going door to door of young voters and telling them to give them their ballots and not to put them in the drop boxes. This is highly illegal and underhanded for the campaign to do this. It has been reported to the authorities.

Come on, sweetie.

No one has done more for white people in Oregon than Barack Obama.

Makes me proud of my former home state! :o)

This is EXCELLENT news for notaclue!

LK

This is truly an amazing crowd and it gives me goose bumps to see it, just like being part of a crowd of a mere 20,000 did in Wilmington back before Super Tuesday. But before we get tooooooo excited, crowd size doesn't mean anything relative to getting elected. It generates excitement and that's great stuff, but the kinds of people who show up for events are Obama voters. The kind of older, whiter, more rural people who tend to vote for McCain don't show up for big events. This is clearly an over-generalization, but its also somewhat true.

I don't mean to be a downer - I want Obama to win as badly as anyone here and I'm optimistic that he will. I'm just old enough to have seen many campaigns where the candidate who got the biggest crowds got crushed in the election. So don't take this as any sort of indication that the race is in hand. Its just starting and its gonna take a lot of hard work and dedication and money to get 'er done.

So give generously in whichever of those area(s) you can!

LOL, I just went to a Hillary fan web site. Here's a repeated dismissal response to Obama speaking to a crowd of 75,000 people: 'he just bussed them in, like he has done before'.

What kind of level of disconnect with reality can there be to believe a preposterous assertion like 'bussing in' tens of thousands of folks to a rally?

Fifty to a bus, that would be, eh, how many busses...........a thousand busses to bus in say, 50,000 of those 75,000?

This mass hysteria lowers the common denominator even further. I suppose in 2012 or 2016 the campaigns will be featuring special smoke effects, loud music and dancing, and some kind of "let's get ready to rumble"-style announcer to introduce the candidate to the stage.

Not only was this a record crowd for Obama, it was also "a record crowd for an Oregon political event."

http://blog.oregonlive.com/breakingnews/2008/05/obamamayvisit.html

This is a crowd drawn by enthusiasm, curiosity, hope. Not a smoke machine in sight. Just a group looking for a change from the policies and positions of the past, e.g. the last week's debate on "Appeasement":

From "Head of State"

http://headofstate.blogspot.com/2008/05/hot-bush-injection-brief-history-of.html

Monday, May 19, 2008

Hot Bush "Injection": A Brief History of Appeasement

It was this morning, while on the elliptical machine, that I heard the 20th (when I began counting) reference to Bush having "injected" foreign policy, via his raising of "appeasement" before the Knesset, into the Democratic campaign debate.

Aside from the face that a Bush injection would likely require more investigation from the FDA and CDC than vaccinations laced with 50% thimerosal, the discussion, which has shown surprising legs, has revealed a remarkable lack of basic knowledge about the distinctions between negotiation (e.g. Nixon's intervention with, at the time a rogue Chinese state, which largely prevented conflict and helped to usher China into the family of nations; ) and appeasement--ranging from the Kevin James school of international policy negotiation through utter lack of knowledge to more informed but still significantly incomplete or incorrect understandings of appeasement as it has been used in this context.

Therefore, I provide you with brief, fully accurate history of the "appeasement" that has been raised in these debates, so that those who wish to use actual fact in advancing their arguments can do so (For those who wish to continue to rely on insinuation, distortion, or the ritual, repetitive, seemingly talismanic use of the cry "He's an appeaser! You know! Like Munich! Like Chamberlain!" without knowing what this actually means. Please proceed to Remedial History, room 101B. No gum).

The Munich Agreement:

The Brief Pre-History of Munich:

Hitler, levered into power in January of 1933 (ironically after their first significant national election outcome decrease in 1932, after which they very well may have faded into their earlier insignificance) through the dramatic miscalculations of former Chancellor Von Papen (who, in his proposed role as Vice-Chancellor, hoped to be the "power behind the throne", and to return to the Chancellorship) and prominent Nationalist Alfred Hugenberg, among others to isolate and co-opt Hitler in a cabinet of Conservative Nationalists ("We've hired him"--Von Papen; "We've boxed him in"-Hugenberg), who persuaded the reluctant, aging President Hindenberg to accept this agreement, soon gained primacy and control over the cabinet, government, and increasingly the nation, through a series of questionable legislative (e.g. "The Enabling Act") and viciously revolutionary and counter-revolutionary (i.e., the elimination of other political parties, the Rohm Purge, brutal and cynical anti-Semitic actions by the SA, the Gleischaltung or "Coordination" of virtually all German organizations and press in 1934) actions.

After gaining such control, and with an autarkic economy that, from the start, invested huge sums in rearmament, Hitler brought the German military into coordination as well, under the aegis of the compliant General Blomberg, and with a shared mission of challenging the restraints placed upon German armament under the Versailles Treaty which followed World War I (Hitler's railing against this treaty had been a key element in the rise of the Nazis to power, particularly in the most dire economic phases of the Weimar Republic). In a series of shocking and escalating violations of this treaty, Germany announced the reestablishment of the German Air Force (1935), the reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936) and the Anschluss of Austria (1937), Hitler began an express drive for expansion conveyed as a correction of the Versailles Treaty, but in fact a clearly stated intent to increase the "living space" (Lebensraum) of Germany, and to attain hegemony in Europe (and, eventually, beyond).

In 1938, under the pretext of incorporating the Sudeten Germans who lived in Czechoslovakia (and utilizing Czech Nazi sympathizers to provoke manufactured "incidents" among this group), Hitler continued this expansionist drive by threatening, beginning in the famous "Weekend Crisis" of May 20-22, 1938, to attack Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Sudetens. Months of anti-Czech propaganda created by the Goebbels-controlled ministry continued through June, July and August. Following a vicious tirade at the conclusion of the Party Congress against the Czechs on Sept. 12, threatening action if the "issues" regarding the Sudetenland were not resolved. This provoked a wave of fear and disturbance across France and the Sudetenland.

As a result, on September 15, Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich to meet with Hitler. Hitler, in this first meeting, presented Chamberlain with an apparent fait accompli, stating that he would settle the matter himself "one way or another", clearly implying force. Chamberlain met this with the remark that under such conditions, there was no further point in talking--after which, Hitler tactically receded and stated that if the question of incorporation of the Sudetenland was open, discussions should continue. Hitler's ultimate goal here was to use the tactic of Sudeten independence to force Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudeten potion of its nation to Germany, claiming that "we want to Czechs"--e.g., the remaining part of the country--and that without such an incorporation, he would attack--thus unleashing the protective guarantees of France to Czechoslovakia, and thereby, a second World War.

Under such pressure, France, Britain placed pressure on Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland. Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier (the French premier) provided the basis for the Munich Agreement--which indeed carved off the Sudetenland, leading to Chamberlain's notorious statement of "peace in our time"--set along side Goebbels statement that "We have achieved everything we wanted according to the small plan, while the big plan is...for the moment, not realizable".

Hitler, in fact, intended to incorporate the rest of Czechoslovakia--and was described as disappointed that the agreement had denied him the opportunity for a war against the Czechs that would allow him this full territorial conquest in a single step. In March of 1939, following a similar propaganda barrage regarding Slovakian nationalist independence, Hitler threatened Czech President Benes with the razing of Belgrade, should he not cede the rest of the nation. Under such threat, Benes collapsed, and the Germans seized the remaining portion of Czechoslovakia without resistance.

Ironically, these constant risk-all gambits led Hitler to his fatal mistake--the conquest of Poland, which, although "victorious", led Britain, France, and ultimately the USA to enter the fight against Germany, and Germany to seek to end the battle against these enemies by removing their most likely ally--the Soviet Union--a combined two front battle which led to the downfall of Nazi Germany.

This was appeasement.

The appeasement here was agreeing to give away Czechoslovakia--carving it into sections, and giving the section, and eventually the nation, away. It was shameful--and wrong.

Negotiation: Talking To Leaders

Despite the endless rhetoric of the past week, negotiation is not appeasement.

Two of many examples:

Nixon's Rapprochement With China:

Despite the well-known failings of the Nixon Presidency, Nixon's engagement with China remains a signal achievement. Note that Nixon, throughout his career, was an ardent fighter of Communism. Thus, we might have fully expected him to take the "negotiation is weakness" position with a country that, at the time, was regarded as a rogue nation in the West.

Nevertheless, this fervent anti-Communist chose to negotiate--a marked change from previous U.S. policy--and continued to do so even as highly inflammatory border attacks occurred between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, stating that "We simply cannot afford to leave China outside the family of nations." (a statement that would likely draw errant fire of commentators from the Right if it were uttered today). With a persistent diplomacy through 1969-1972, culminating in a meeting with Chou en Lai, these negotiations led to a dramatic thawing of relations with both China and the Soviet Union--where, in meetings with Leonid Brezhnev, an anti-ballistic missile treaty, a trade agreement worth a billion dollars, and a SALT treaty were signed.

Here, talk--negotiation--decried as weakness this past week--and at the time of these negotiations--led to success.

Reagan and Gorbachev

Reagan, of course, was noted for referring to the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire."

Despite this stance, he too was willing to negotiate with Gorbachev in the interests of nuclear disarmament--and despite the objections of many on the Right, whose statements at the time regarding the weakness of negotiation could be easily grafted onto the present debates.

As we know, Reagan's meetings, according to Alan Greenspan, "started the sequence of geopolitical initiatives that led Mr. Gorbachev to figuratively tear down the Berlin Wall", and contributed to the break up of the Soviet Union.

Many from the right called for aggressive military action--for missiles first, rather than negotiation


.
Talk--negotiation--led to success.

Note that in each case, the President talked with a leader who they regarded as hostile--in the face of those who argued then, as they do now, that talking-- negotiation--signifies weakness.

In each case, talking--strong, informed negotiation--did not result in appeasement of the aggressor, but instead resulted in the desired outcome--in one case, the component breakup of the aggressor nation--in another the end of a threat of nuclear conflict--without a single loss of life.

Negotiation is not appeasement.

When negotiation is chosen, however, it will be the case that those who simply wished for the visceral strike--the simplistic first solution of subduing an enemy through the use of might--will not find its satisfaction. We have seen the results of this position, throughout the years--from the events recounted in the first section, to the present.

Perhaps, in negotiation, it is *they* who have been appeased.

If so, given history--this was a favorable outcome indeed.

Cite:

Head of State

http://headofstate.blogspot.com/2008/05/hot-bush-injection-brief-history-of.html